This 1992 Clinical Chemistry Forum asks if accuracy and precision goals for the laboratory can be specified by reference to medical requirements, which are a function of the total laboratorytesting process as well as the needs of patients, clinicians, and societal institutions.Furthermore, medical decisions and decisions about medical requirements must be made in situations of uncertainty and thus are subject to predictable cognitive errors. The interaction of all these factors must be considered by patients, laboratorians, and clinicians to identify practical and effective performance goals. Pathologists and clinical chemists are uniquely trained to identify thoughtful clinicians who are knowledgeable in quantitative judgment to participate in this goal-setting endeavor. It is time for these parties to accumulate the available data and engage in the synthesis of effective performance goals. testing are attributable to portions of the testing cycle other than the analysis. In fact, as much as 90% of the problems have been attributable to the pre-and postanalytical portions (4). The quality requirements for precision and accuracy in analysis will differ for different clinical situations, and will also differ for diagnostic and monitoring decisions.
, which shows the total testing process. Figures similar to Figure 1 have appeared in previous symposia (2). It is the goal of the present Forum to focus on the portion of Figure 1 from sample analysis to patient and provider agreement on an action. It is the laboratorian's hypothesis that the quality of the action is linked to both the quality of the analysis and the quality of reasoning. Further, it is the goal of the conference to devise a system whereby the quality requirements in the analysis could be specified such that they meet all the expectations of the reasoning and action-decision portion of the process. Elsewhere, other Forum participants (3, 4)
have indicated a paucity of data to illustrate an alteration of action decisions attributable to either inaccuracy or imprecision of the analysis. Furthermore, most problems in laboratory testing are attributable to portions of the testing cycle other than the analysis. In fact, as much as 90% of the problems have been attributable to the pre-and postanalytical portions (4). The quality requirements for precision and accuracy in analysis will differ for different clinical situations, and will also differ for diagnostic and monitoring decisions.
The DecisionMilieu
Data become more useful when they are collated into carefully organized information, further collated, and then synthesized into knowledge. The application of this knowledge into decision-making and policy-making requires a further synthesis of the data into wisdom (5). The use of laboratory data for making wise decisions regarding individual patients as well as wise population-health policy requires synthesis of data into information and knowledge. This synthesis of data into wisdom occursthrough the processof medical cognition. Simultaneously, the same data are acted upon by patients and family members as well as societal institutions. It is the coalescence of these three viewpoints (patients, caregivers, and society) that can be expected to yield wise medical decisions, as illustrated in Figure  2 . This conceptual analysis is similar to that of Eddy's discussion of the "anatomy of a decision" (6). As Eddy points out, a part of these policy and health-care decisions are scientific and require quantitative, logical thought. A second part of the decision process involves individual preferences and yields judgments that are used to make individual patient-care decisions as well as set medical policy.
it is important for laboratorians to realize that laboratory data are acted upon by patients, family members, physicians, and societal bodies to generate decisions. Therefore, any quality specification for the precision and accuracy of the laboratory data must include a consideration of the thoughts and preferences of those who are using these data.
Cognitionand Common Cognitive Errors
In their classic paper, "Judgment under Uncertainty," Tversky and Kahneman (7) outline the most frequent errors in individual judgments regarding uncertain probabilities.
These concepts are important, becausethe interpretation of laboratory data requires an appreciation for the prior probability of disease and the probability of normal or abnormal results in specific clinical situations. The most common biases are representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustments.
"Representativeness" refers to misrepresenting the probability that a given individual is a member of a given class of individuals based on the degree to which that individual This involves the false notion that estimation of the prior probability of the presence of a disease in a given individual is related to how easy it is to remember a similar individual with that disease. The data they (7) present illustrate that frequencies of abstract events are often overestimated, whereas frequencies of concrete events are underestimated.
A third cognitive bias is attributed to "anchoring and adjustment." When asked to estimate a prior probabifity of disease in a given individual, most observers have a first impression.
This would be the anchoring point. Usually, when individuals realize their anchoring point is incorrect, they make an insufficient adjustment of that anchoring point. This causes individuals both to be overconfident of their probability estimates and to overestimate the probability of consecutive events (the optimism of planning) and underestimate the probability of failure when the failure rate for each step in the process is relatively low. In addition to Tversky They classify them as probabilistic, causal, or deterministic.
Probabilistic
reasoning involves the use of rigorous data and Bayes' theorem. Laboratorians are familiar with Bayes' theorem as well as the conceptsof sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values, and likelihood ratio (11 Confidence in decision-making is important for clinicians. It is also important to ascertain whether those who appear to know more, know more about how much they know (14) .
Cognitive psychologists studying this question have discovered that knowing more increases performance, as would be expected-but knowing just a little more leads to overconfidence and therefore to poorer performance. This overconfidence decreases with an increasing knowledge base, and those with the greatest knowledge base tend to have a slight underconfidence. This is the concept of calibration of intuitive probability estimates (3, 14).
Patient Cognition
The needs of the patient must be paramount in any medical decision-making process. Likewise, the psychological profile of the patient is important. Patients differ in their desires to take risks or avoid risks and in their evaluation of potential gains and potential losses. These concepts have been studied (15). It is important to remember that patient cognition is subject to the same biases as all cognition: availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment. Patient outcomes must be optimized, and the value of the outcome must be considered for the patient first, society and health-care providers second. and valproic acid. However, there are some differences, as shown in Table 2 . The linkage in the German system between medical relevance and accuracy and precision goals needs to be further delineated. We must begin by taking the first step and the time to take it is now.
it is important to end on a note of humility. Even though we are ready to embark on making a list of very important specifications, we should remember the words of Henry David Thoreau: "If you look over a list of medicinal recipes in vogue in the last century, how foolish and useless they all seem to be! And yet, we use equally absurd ones with faith today" (37) . We must begin immediately to improve the present.
